The authors propose new McEliece cryptosystems based on punctured Reed-Muller (RM) codes. They successfully show that the commonly known attacks, such as the Minder-Shokrollahi attack, the Chizhov-Borodin attack, and the square code attack, are ineffective against the proposed RM code-based McEliece cryptosystem. We developed an optimal puncturing scheme to prevent the above-mentioned attacks for the proposed RM code-based cryptosystems in a sense that the exact locations of puncturing positions with the minimum number of punctured columns of the generator matrix should be found for attacking. It is important to carry out the minimum number of punctures, however, as code modification resulting from puncturing can reduce security. Additionally, the square code attack can be prevented in the proposed RM code-based McEliece cryptosystems by using both the proposed puncturing method and random insertion methods.
Introduction
It is widely known that most conventional public key cryptosystems, such as RSA cryptosystem, elliptic curve cryptosystem, and others, can be broken by using sophisticated operations over quantum computers. Thus, many studies have been devoted to developing robust cryptosystems resistant to attacks by quantum computers; these are known as post-quantum cryptosystems. One well-known post-quantum cryptosystem is a code-based cryptosystem using Goppa code, which was first introduced by McEliece [1] . Although encryption and decryption of the McEliece cryptosystem are usually faster than those of the conventional cryptosystems such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems, it requires very large public and private key sizes. Thus, there have been many efforts to reduce the key sizes of the McEliece cryptosystems.
One approach to reducing key sizes is adopting other error correcting codes in place of the Goppa code [2] [3] [4] and utilising their mathematical structures. For example, the generalised ReedSolomon (GRS) code [2] , the polar code [3] , and the Reed-Muller (RM) code [4] have been used for the code-based cryptosystems. In the GRS code-based cryptosystem, the private key matrix is determined by two vectors α, v, and thus the key size of the McEliece cryptosystem can be dramatically reduced. Further, it is known that McEliece cryptosystems using RM codes can add much larger number of errors than the minimum distance of the RM codes, meaning the matrix size can also be reduced while maintaining security levels [4] .
However, the McEliece cryptosystem based on RM codes is proved to be insecure due to the Minder-Shokrollahi [5] and the Chizhov-Borodin's attacks. While the structure of error correcting codes helps us to reduce key size, it may also reveal information on the private key to attackers. To avoid this, a McEliece cryptosystem based on the GRS or RM codes with random-column insertion for the generator matrix is proposed [6, 7] . It was found; however, it turns out that the proposed system can be broken by square code attacks [8] .
In this paper, we propose a modification of McEliece cryptosystems based on punctured RM codes. In this modification, some columns of the generator matrix of the original RM codes are carefully punctured to prevent effective cryptanalysis. In fact, the puncturing of the generator matrix in the McEliece cryptosystem was considered in the quasi-cyclic-low-density parity check (QC-LDPC) code-based McEliece cryptosystem [9] . However, in [9] , only the security of the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem in terms of information set decoding was analysed. Alternatively, we focus on the effect of puncturing of the generator matrix to determine how many columns should be punctured and which locations are most effective to hide the mathematical structure of the code from attackers.
Here, we focus on the McEliece cryptosystem based on RM codes, while the modification of the RM codes by puncturing can be applied to the other code-based McEliece cryptosystems. We will show that if public keys are properly modified by the proposed sophisticated puncturing of the generator matrix, with or without randomly inserting random columns into the punctured generator matrix, all known attacks for the McEliece cryptosystem based on RM codes are successfully repelled. While an attack with a randomly permuted and scrambled generator matrix is not able to find the mathematical structure of the original code, the legitimate receiver can reconstruct the original message because they know the exact locations of punctured and inserted columns of the generator matrix. We perform security analysis with respect to the known attacks for the proposed McEliece cryptosystem based on punctured RM codes with successful results. This paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we present the preliminaries for the McEliece cryptosystems based on the RM codes and their attack algorithms. In Section 3, we propose a modified McEliece cryptosystems based on the RM code with sophisticated column puncturing of the generator matrix with or without inserting random columns and verify the its security against the various known attacks in Section 4. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce RM codes, the McEliece cryptosystem, and various attack algorithms for the McEliece cryptosystem.
RM codes
The RM code RM(r,m) is a linear code defined by Boolean functions of m variables and degrees less than or equal to r for any integers m and r with 0 ≤ r ≤ m. Boolean functions of m variables are evaluated on 2 m different positions, which correspond to a code word with a length of 2 m in RM(r,m). RM(r,m) is the set of code words obtained by evaluating all Boolean functions of m variables and degrees less than or equal to r. The set of Boolean functions in the variables v 1 , …, v m of degrees less than or equal to r is denoted by B(r, {v 1 , …, v m }). The fact that all Boolean functions generating code words in B(r − 1, {v 1 , …, v m }) are also in B(r, {v 1 , …, v m }) implies the following proposition: Proposition 1 (Minder and Shokrollahi, 2007 [4] ): For any integer m, we have
The code length n, dimension k, and the minimum distance d of RM(r,m) are given as
We require the following definitions for the proposed RM codebased McEliece cryptosystem:
Definition 1: The support of a codeword c ∈ RM(r,m) is defined as the set of indices i such that c i ≠ 0, which is denoted by supp(c).
Definition 2: Let c be a codeword of C and L be an index set. Then, proj L (c) is a sub-codeword which is composed of the components with indices in L from c. Also for a linear code C, we define
Example 1: Let c = (11011001) and L = {1, 2, 3, 7}. Then, proj L (c) = (1100), which is composed of the first, second, third, and seventh components of c.
Proposition 2 (Minder and Shokrollahi [5] ): Let x be a codeword with the minimum weight in RM(r,m). Then, there exist x 1 , x 2 , …, x r ∈ RM(1, m) such that
where x i is a codeword with the minimum weight in RM(1, m) and x i ⋅ x j denotes the componentwise multiplication.
Propositions 1 and 2 are used as the main tools for the MinderShokrollahi attack, which will be explained in the following sections.
McEliece cryptosystems
McEliece introduced a public key cryptosystem based on the difficulty of decoding random linear codes, which consists of three algorithms, key generation, encryption, and decryption, as follows
Key generation: Let G be a k × n generator matrix of the (n,k) linear code. Let S be a k × k scrambling matrix and P an n × n permutation matrix. Bob generates the public key by calculating G′ = SGP, where S, P, and G are the private keys of Bob. The error correction capability t of the linear code with generator matrix G is also disclosed.
Encryption: Alice generates a code word corresponding to the message m ∈ {0, 1} k using Bob's public key (G′, t). She chooses the random error vector e ∈ {0, 1} n with a maximum Hamming weight of t and sends the ciphertext c = mG′ + e to Bob.
Decryption: When Bob receives the ciphertext c, he first multiplies P −1 to the right hand side of the ciphertext as cP −1 = mSG + eP −1 . Using a decoding algorithm, Bob finds m S, and by multiplying S −1 he can recover the original message m. Originally, the generator matrix G of the McEliece cryptosystem is a generator matrix of the Goppa code, and there have subsequently been many suggestions regarding generator matrices of the different linear codes, including RM codes.
In this paper, we focus on the generator matrix of the RM codes. RM code-based cryptosystems were first proposed by Sidelnikov [4] ; now referred to as the 'Sidelnikov cryptosystem'. In this cryptosystem, Sidelnikov introduced a number of errors greater than the error correction capability t (in the case of RM code, 2 m − r − 1 − 1), e.g. for (n, k, r) = (1024, 176, 3) and (2048, 232, 3), the number of errors is > 200 and 400, respectively. Even with these excessive errors, the legitimate receiver can successfully remove them with high accuracy by using an efficient decoding algorithm of the RM code proposed by Sidelnikov and Pershakov [10] . This means that an attacker should correct a larger number of errors than the error correctability t in the ciphertext using decoding of random linear code, which imposes more difficulties on the attacker. However, it was shown that the mathematical structure of RM code in the public key (a randomised generator matrix) reveals the secret information, random permutation matrix, and private key using sophisticated attacking algorithms [5, 11] . It should be noted that the McEliece cryptosystem based on RM codes was broken by three known attacks.
To avoid the Minder-Shokrollahi and Chizhov-Borodin attacks, a modification scheme for generator matrices by inserting random columns into the random positions of the generator matrices was proposed [6] [7] [8] . In the subsequent discussion, we will use the following notations for the insertion of random columns into the generator matrix: Let L I be a set of inserted column indices of the , and the remaining decryption procedure is the same as that of the McEliece cryptosystem. It was shown that when the insertion is solely used for modification, the system is not secure by the square code attacks.
However, by using the random insertion after the sophisticated puncturing of generator matrix of the RM codes, it can be shown that the modified generator matrices do not reveal secret information to attacker. Furthermore, we will show that the RM code-based cryptosystem can be resurrected by using the proposed modification of McEliece cryptosystem based on the punctured RM codes.
Attacks on McEliece cryptosystems
In this section, we briefly describe the main ideas of decisional cryptanalyses for the McEliece cryptosystem based on RM codes. [4] .: One of the major objectives of an attack on the McEliece cryptosystems is to find the permutation matrix P. Let C = RM(r, m) σ be the permuted code of RM(r,m) for an unknown permutation σ. In the Minder-Shokrollahi attack, the attack procedure to find σ is composed of three steps:
Minder-Shokrollahi's attack
1. Find code words in C, which belong to RM(r − 1, m) σ . It is necessary to find enough code words to build a basis of RM(r − 1, m) σ .
2. Iterate the previous step until obtaining RM(1, m) σ .
3. Determine a permutation τ such that RM(1, m)
As we can see, the first step is crucial for the success of this attack. Let x ∈ C be a minimum weight code word. Then, we define C supp(x) as the shortened code of C on supp(x), that is find only code words which are zero on supp(x) in C, and then puncture their components with indices in supp(x). For example, for supp(x) = {1, 4}, we have c′ = (c 2 , c 3 , c 5 , …, c n ) ∈ C supp(x) . Clearly, the length of the code words in C supp(x) is n − | supp(x)|. Then, C supp(x) is a concatenated code defined as (see (1)) where × denotes the direct product defined in [5] .
As the permutation is unknown, the position of RM(r − 1, m − r) in C supp(x) is expected to be also unknown. However, the algorithm to find the position of RM(r − 1, m − r) is proposed by Minder and Shokrollahi [5] , and thus a code word in RM(r − 1, m) σ can be determined, which corresponds to the first step in the above attack. [11] .: From the RM code RM(r,m), RM(2r, m) can be constructed with low polynomial-time complexity. Similarly, RM(kr,m) can easily be constructed. [8] : According to [8] , applying the insertion of random columns to the McEliece cryptosystem based on RM codes does not protect against square code attacks, which use a property of the product of random-column inserted RM codes. The product of codes is defined as follows: 
Chizhov-Borodin's attack

Square code attacks
With this argument, an attacker can discover the set L I using the public key of the McEliece cryptosystem based on RM codes in the polynomial time.
Modifications of RM code-based cryptosystem
In this section, we propose modifications to the McEliece cryptosystem based on RM code. The proposed cryptosystem starts with the modification of the generator matrix of the RM code RM(r,m), where n = 2 m and k = ∑ i = 0 r m i . Here, we consider two modifications: (i) modification by puncturing at the minimum number of the specified locations of the generator matrix and (ii) modification by both the sophisticated puncturing and random insertion of columns in the generator matrix.
Modification by puncturing
The proposed modification of the McEliece cryptosystem can be presented by the following three algorithms:
( ′ as the public keys. Note that the parameter t is determined according to the Sidelnikov decoding algorithm, which can correct almost all errors to a limit greater than the original error correction capability of RM codes [10] . The private keys are P, S, G, and L D . 
Modification with puncturing and insertion
Although the modification of the RM code-based McEliece cryptosystem by insertion was proposed [7] , this cryptosystem was still vulnerable to the square code attack [8] . However, it can be shown that the proposed cryptosystem, which simultaneously uses sophisticated puncturing and random insertion, can prevent the square code attack along with other known attacks.
(1) Key generation (1-1) Puncturing: The random puncturing procedure is the same as that in the previous subsection by L D , whose code is called a punctured code. (1-2) Insertion: Let L I = {l 1 , …, l I } be a set of randomly chosen |L I | column indices, where (1-3) Generating S and P: Let S be a k × k scrambling matrix and
The public key is generated by calculating G DI ′ = SG 
Security of the proposed cryptosystems
In this section, we discuss the efficacy of the proposed cryptosystem against the known attacks such as the MinderShokrollahi attack, Chizhov-Borodin attack, square code attack, and information set decoding.
Minder-Shokrollahi's attack
Let C be a permutated RM code, i.e. C = RM(r, m) σ by the permutation σ, that is, the permutation matrix P, and x be the minimum weight code word in C. We would like to find the minimum |L D |, where the Minder-Shokrollahi attack becomes ineffective. Again, note that all punctured positions are included in supp(x) in the proposed puncturing method Let C′ be the punctured code of C by the index set L D . The first step of the MinderShokrollahi attack is to find the minimum weight code words. Let x′ be a minimum weight code word of C′, which is a punctured code word of x ∈ C. We can then find C supp(x′) ′ . The support set of the punctured code word is denoted as
Clearly, the code lengths of C supp(x) and C supp(x′) ′ are the same and C supp(x) ⊆ C supp(x′) ′ , as all deleted positions are included in supp(x). Now, we are interested in the case of
, for which the Minder-Shokrollahi attack is ineffective. In the following theorem, we can determine the minimum number of punctured positions required to prevent the Minder-Shokrollahi attack.
Theorem 1: For the RM code RM(r, m), a minimum
. The support set of the minimum weight code word in proj supp(x) (C) is the essential punctured locations, where x is the minimum weight code word of C.
Proof: It is easy to check that RM(r, m − r) = proj supp(x) (C).
Thus, the minimum weight code word of proj supp(x) (C) is 2 m − 2r . Let y be the minimum weight code word in proj supp(x) (C). Then, there exists z ∈ C such that y = proj supp(x) (z) .
Then, proj N ∖ supp(x) (z) clearly belongs to C supp(x′) ′ but not to C supp(x) , where N = {1, 2, …, n}. Thus, C supp(x) ⊊ C supp(x′) ′ . □ Example 2: Consider an RM code RM (2, 5) . Suppose that the permutation matrix and scrambling matrix are identity matrices for simplicity. Clearly, one of the minimum weight code words is x = (1111111100…00) ∈ RM(2, 5) or proj supp(x) (C) = RM (2, 3) . Then, one of the minimum weight code words in proj supp(x) (C) is y = (10001000). Also, we set L D = {1, 5} and the punctured code word as x is x′ = (?111?11100⋯00) = (11111100…00)., and z in (3) is z = (10001000 | 10001000 | 10001000 | 10001000) .
Since
Example 3: Consider the RM code RM(1, 4). Suppose that the permutation matrix and scrambling matrix are identity matrices for simplicity. Therefore, one of the minimum weight code words is x = (1111111100000000). Then, proj supp(x) (C) = RM(1, 3) and the minimum weight of proj supp(x) (C) is 4. Thus, to neutralise the Minder-Shokrollahi attack at least four components should be punctured. If we puncture fewer than four components, the attack cannot be neutralised. This can be described as follows: Let 
Then, we have C supp(x) ⊊ C supp(x′) ′ . Similarly, it is not difficult to check that
where (see (8) ) It is difficult to correctly decompose component codes C i ′ from C supp(x′) ′ , as many random component codes of C supp(x′) ′ can form RM(r − 1, m − r) + {0, an element in the basis of RM(r, m − r)}.
Chizhov-Borodin's attack
The Chizhov-Borodin attack uses the property that the dual code of RM is also the RM code. For punctured RM codes, their dual codes are shortened RM codes [12] . It is not possible to recover the 
RM codes from the shortened RM codes, as some rows and columns are deleted from the generator matrix. Therefore, the Chizhov-Borodin attack cannot be applied to the McEliece cryptosystem based on the proposed punctured RM codes. 
and the generator matrix of its dual code is given as
The dual code of RM(1, 3) is also RM (1, 3) ; however, the dual code of the punctured RM code is also the shortened code of the RM code. This means that G D ⊥ is the generator matrix of the shortened RM code of RM(1, 3); however, the rows deleted by shortening cannot be recovered. [8] . Thus, inserting ten random columns requires 2 67.5 more operations to successfully neutralise a square code attack. Since the attacker must apply the Minder-Shokrollahi attack after a successful the square code attack, an attacker requires more time to complete this attack. The required complexity for operations of the square code attack on RM(r, 2r) for r = 5, 6 is given in Table 1 . Therefore, it is difficult to apply the square code attack on RM(r, 2r) with the insertion of random columns.
Square code attack
For m > 2r, using the puncturing of the RM codes, we can also prevent the square code attack because (2) will no longer hold. In the case of m = 2r, we find that if there is a code word with weight 1 in C 2 , the dimensions of C 2 can be reduced by deleting a column. Although the square code of RM(2r, m) does not contain code words with a weight of 1, we can control the weight using the proposed puncturing method. It is known that the square code is RM(2r, m) and the minimum weight of the square code is 2 m − 2r .
Since 2 m − 2r ≥ 2, deleting one column does not reduce the dimensions [8] . However, puncturing more than 2 m − 2r − 1 columns (2) does not hold, similar to the case of RM(r, 2r). Thus, the square code attack cannot be applied to the proposed McEliece cryptosystems. The minimum weight of punctured code in RM(r, m)
2 is reduced when we puncture the code words in the support set of the minimum weight code word in RM(r,m). Additionally, the square code attack is effectively prevented when m − 2r = 1, 2, because the number of required puncturing bits is small.
Information set decoding attack
The information set decoding attack is based on finding k error-free bits c k of ciphertext randomly. An attacker can choose k columns of G DI ′ with error free indices from the ciphertext, which is denoted by G DI ′(k) . Then, c k = m ⋅ G DI′ (k) + e k with e k = 0, and the decryption is performed using m = c k ⋅ G DI
. Lee and Brickell [13] generalised the information set decoding attack for e k ≠ 0, where the weight of e k can be less than or equal to a given integer j. The complexity of the attack is given as
where T j −1 = ∑ i = 0 n and t, it is reasonable to compare the term T j for complexity of an information set decoding attack. For example, consider the case of RM (3, 10) . Using the decoding algorithm in [10] , the number of correctable bit errors is t = 200. In the case of (n, k, t) = (1024, 176, 200) without puncturing, the approximate value of T j is 2 61 . In the case of (n′, k, t′) = (1008, 176, 192) with puncturing, we have T j ≃ 2 60 . In Table 2 , for the cases of RM (3, 10) and RM(3, 11) with or without puncturing, the corresponding values of T j are compared. Table 1 provides the computational complexity of the information set decoding is slightly reduced after column puncturing. Thus, the effect of puncturing columns of the generator matrix for the proposed cryptosystems should be minimised.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed secure modification methods for the McEliece cryptosystem based on the punctured RM codes. We found the exact number and locations of puncturing of the generator matrix of the original RM codes to prevent the aforementioned attacks. While the previous McEliece cryptosystem based on RM codes is vulnerable to known attacks such as the Minder-Shokrollahi attack, the Chizhov-Borodin attack, and square code attack, the proposed punctured RM code-based McEliece cryptosystem can repel these attacks. While security is slightly reduced as a result of puncturing, the proposed cryptosystem can be revived. 
